Soldiers and Leaders in Plutarch’s Galba and Otho by Blois, L. de






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
 5 
Soldiers and Leaders in Plutarch’s Galba and Otho 
Lukas de Blois 
In this short paper, which is dedicated to Tony Birley in honour of his seventieth birthday, 
I would like to make a few notes on the way in which Plutarch in his Galba and Otho speaks 
about leadership and crowd, crowds in this case being military mobs. 
Leadership and collective attitudes in Plutarch’s works 
A commonplace, which is widespread in Plutarch’s Lives, and occurs also in his political 
treatises, regards the connection between the mental attitude of masses, either groups of 
soldiers or city-mobs, on the one hand, and the quality of leadership on the other. If urban 
mobs or soldiers are irreparably oriented towards violence and greed, and not to wisdom and 
stability, leaders cannot govern in a sound, wisdom-loving manner, but have to content 
themselves with an opportunistic, adroit kind of leadership, i.e. with the political behavior of 
politicians such as Timoleon or Julius Caesar.1 If this type of adroit, non-philosophical 
leadership fails or is missing, and the mentality of soldiers or city-mobs is utterly materialistic 
and violent, things will take a turn for the worst. 
In Plutarch’s view, groups of soldiers were not much different from city mobs and 
demagoguery could be applied to both of them in a similar way. He praises Aemilius Paullus 
because this leader did not merge the demagogue in the general, οὐ δημαγωγῶν ἐν τῷ 
στρατηγεῖν (Aem. 3.6). Sulla, on the other hand, stirred up or spoiled his soldiers, just like 
mob flatterers within cities do (Sulla 12). In Eumenes 13.4-5 Plutarch describes the 
deteriorating mode of life and mentality of some military leaders during the wars of 
succession of post- Alexandrian times. They had become effeminate, tyrannical, and harsh 
towards one another and hard to reconcile. In Eum. 13.5 Plutarch continues: 
Moreover, by flattering the Macedonian soldiery and lavishing money upon them for banquets 
and sacrifices, in a short time they made the camp a hostelry of festal prodigality and the army a 
mob to be cajoled into the election of its generals as in a democracy. 
Groups of soldiers could act like urban mobs and vote like popular assemblies. According 
to Plutarch, Marius 21.2, Marius received by the votes of his soldiers a more than fair share of 
the booty assembled after the battle of Aquae Sextiae, where Marius’ army had stopped the 
onslaught of the Teutonic warriors. In Plutarch’s biography of Lucullus, 30 and 33-35, the 
army of this general acts like a political mob, under the guidance of demagogical leaders, 
Publius Clodius being one of them. Lucullus, however, stands firm, not being a servant of the 
plethos stratiotikon (οὐκ ὢν θεραπευτικὸς πλήθους στρατιωτικοῦ `, Plut., Luc. 33.2), but in the 
end he forfeits his campaign and loses his army. His soldiers were angry, because they were 
compelled to spend two successive winters in camp (not in a city that was Greek and friendly, 
ibid. 33.2). Besides they suspected that Lucullus had taken most of the booty and had not 
given his men their due. So, in spite of his proven excellent generalship and after all his 
victories his soldiers left him in the lurch, because he had not given them their due, or - in a 
more Plutarchan way - complied to their greed.2 
In Plutarch’s opinion groups of soldiers, Greek and Macedonian mercenaries as well as 
Roman armies, had a strong materialistic attitude, which made them even more difficult than 
city mobs. In this respect Plutarch is standing in a tradition: prejudice about mercenaries is 
very old in Greek literature, as is testified by Xenophon and Isocrates.3 
                                                 
1 See De Blois 1992, 4568-4615, esp. 4600-4611; De Blois 1997b, 209-224; De Blois 2000, 131-139, esp. 134 ff. 
Any translations of Plutarchan passages into English have been borrowed from Loeb editions. 
2 See De Blois 1992, 4606 f. 
3 Isocrates, Paneg. 146; Philippus 120-122; Xenophon, Anab. 6.4.8; cf. Van Soesbergen 1982-1983, 131-145, 
esp. 132-139. 
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In Plutarch’s view, wrongly oriented urban and military mobs needed a strong, 
opportunistic, adroit leadership. Such mobs would rebel against excellent, philosophically 
minded rulers who did not give them what they wanted. Dion, for example, lived in a simple 
and moderate way, as if he were at Plato’s table, but could not please his professional officers 
(Dion 52.2-3). Very soon this Platonic reformer discovered that the mercenaries as well as the 
Syracusan mob were only after material gain, and were not at all interested in sound Platonic 
political reform. Dion could not convince them and went under (Dion 52-57).4 Marcus Brutus 
symbolically decorated his soldier’s weapons and armour with silver and gold, but had not 
much money to make them rich and so had no authority to speak of over his own soldiers 
during the battle of Philippi (Plutarch, Brutus 41-42). In his series of Parallel Lives Plutarch 
pairs him rather ominously with Dion.5 
How difficult it was to guide bands of soldiers is demonstrated by Plutarch in his Caesar.  
Even this great commander, an adroit military leader, who, according to Plutarch, was greatly 
admired by his troops (Caesar 16-17), came into trouble and got mutinies at his hands, when 
he did not fulfil material promises. In Caesar 51.2 Plutarch tells us that men spoke ill of 
Caesar because, after his soldiers had mutinied and killed two men of praetorian rank, 
Cosconius and Galba (what is in a name !), he censured them only so far as to call them 
‘citizens’ instead of ‘soldiers.’ 
Some military commanders gave in and enriched their soldiers in a shameless way, to the 
detriment of the regions they went through. The locus classicus is of course Plutarch, Sulla 
12.6-9, where Plutarch, speaking on Sulla’s campaign in Greece during the first Mithridatic 
War, tells us how Greek sanctuaries were shamelessly plundered to satisfy the greed of the 
Roman soldiers. In Sulla 12.8, comparing Sulla with more frugal and more disciplined 
generals of former generations, Plutarch observes: 
The generals of this later time, however, who won their primacy by force, not merit, and who 
needed their armies for service against one another, rather than against the public enemy, were 
compelled to merge the general in the demagogue, and then, by purchasing the services of their 
soldiers with lavish sums to be spent on luxurious living, they unwittingly made their whole 
country a thing for sale, and themselves slaves of the basest men for the sake of ruling over the 
better (Sulla 12.8).  
Leadership and soldiers in Plutarch’s Galba and Otho 
In the introduction of Plutarch’s Galba, which may have been written earlier than the 
Parallel Lives,6 we see some Plutarchan leadership commonplaces in working order already. 
In the opening lines of the Galba Plutarch tells us: 
Iphicrates the Athenian used to think that the mercenary soldier might well be fond of wealth 
and fond of pleasure, in order that his quest for the means to gratify his desires might lead him 
to fight with greater recklessness; but most people think that a body of soldiers, just like a 
natural body in full vigour, ought to have no initiative of its own, but should follow that of its 
commander. Wherefore Paullus Aemilius, as we are told, finding that the army which he had 
taken over in Macedonia was infected with loquacity and meddlesomeness, as though they were 
all generals, gave out word that each man was to have his hand ready and his sword sharp, but 
that he himself would look out for the rest. Moreover, Plato (Resp. 376c) sees that a good 
commander or general can do nothing unless his army is amenable and loyal; and he thinks that 
the quality of obedience, like the quality characteristic of a king, requires a noble nature and a 
philosophic training, which, above all things, blends harmoniously the qualities of gentleness 
and humanity with those of high courage and aggressiveness. Many dire events, and particularly 
                                                 
4 See De Blois 1978, 123-131; idem 1992, 4604-4611; idem 1997b, 209-224, esp. 216 ff.; idem 2000, 131-139, 
esp. 134 ff.  
5 See De Blois 1992, 4609. 
6 Jones 1971, 74; 79. However, one has to admit that the chronological order of Plutarch’s Lives cannot 
definitely be determined; see Ziegler 1951, 708, 895 and 899-903; Scardigli 1979, 12 f. 
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those which befell the Romans after the death of Nero, bear witness to this, and show plainly 
that an empire has nothing more fearful to show than a military force given over to untrained 
and unreasoning impulses (Plutarch, Galba 1.1-3).7 
According to Christopher Pelling, in this passage there seems to be an emphasis on the 
dangerous and reckless irrationality of ordinary soldiers when they are out of control. Rita 
Scuderi seems to miss this point. In a recently published article she simply speaks of the 
dangers coming from the armies in general.8 
In the following chapters of this Vita, as well as in the subsequent Life of Otho, which both 
are - like the Parallel Lives - mixtures of information and opinions drawn from many 
quarters,9 Plutarch demonstrates how bad leadership at the highest levels of command caused 
a progressive deterioration of military discipline and a progressively worsening military 
misconduct. Some differences with similar stories in the Parallel Lives may be expected. 
Generally Plutarch’s Lives of the Caesars seem to have been closer to history than the Bioi 
Parallelloi.10 In Galba 2.5 Plutarch says that the accurate and circumstantial narration of 
events belongs to formal history (Τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορία), but that it is his duty not to omit 
such incidents as are worthy of mention in the deeds and fates of the Caesars. 
In Plutarch’s Galba the worst kind of leadership is displayed by the emperor himself and 
by his close assistants, men such as Vinius, Laco, and Icelus. Those second line leaders were 
rapacious and acted in an arbitrary, selfish, tyrannical way. In practically all literary sources 
Galba is reproached of giving them too much latitude,11 whereas he tried to reclaim Nero’s 
gifts from the many who had received them - except 10 %, which they were allowed to 
keep12- and to be an example of old-fashioned severitas towards the soldiers, even if they had 
more or less justified claims to make.13 Besides Galba punished Nero’s creatures in a rather 
erratic way, killing some of them, but sparing the lives of the worst hoodlums, men such as 
Tigellinus, who had earned Vinius’ friendship.14 On the other hand he organized the murder 
of  Clodius Macer, an usurper in the province of Africa, but also of Fonteius Capito, 
commander of one of the Rhine armies, which may have raised suspicions among other 
military leaders.15  
Galba repeatedly treated groups of soldiers badly, thus earning the hatred of many military 
men. First of all he never gave the soldiers, neither the praetorians nor the legionaries, the 
donatives that had been promised to them by Nymphidius Sabinus, who in this way had lured 
the soldiers away from their adherence to Nero, nor did he give them a more modest amount 
of money, which, according to Plutarch, Galba 18.2, would have satisfied many soldiers. 
Remarkably enough, Plutarch is the only one to give this essential detail. According to 
Plutarch, Tacitus, Suetonius and Cassius Dio, Galba stated that it was his custom to enroll 
soldiers, not to buy them.16 This had obviously become a famous dictum by the time they 
wrote their works. In his report about this issue Plutarch hardly deviates from other literary 
sources. Plutarch tells us that the soldiers began to cherish a dire and savage hatred towards 
                                                 
7 On this passage see for example Ash 1997, 189-214.  
8 See C.B.R. Pelling, ‘Rhetoric, paideia and Psychology in Plutarch’s Lives’, in Pelling 2002, 346 n. 10. Scuderi 
1995, 404f. 
9 Cf. Jones 1971, 72-80, esp. 78-80, where he speaks about the character of Plutarch’s Galba and Otho. 
According to Jones, the Galba and Otho are not the fruit of deep research (p. 80). 
10 See Ash 1997, 190 f.; Duff 1999, 19 f.; Pelling 2002, 195 n. 68. 
11 See Plutarch, Galba 7.1; 11.1-2; 12.1-3; 17.1-5; Tacitus, Hist. 1.6.1; 1.7.3; 1.13.1; Suetonius, Galba 14.2 and 
15.2; Cassius Dio 64.2.1-2.  
12 Plutarch, Galba 16.2-3; cf. Cassius Dio 64.3.4. Tacitus, Hist. 1.20.1-2 observes that most of the assessed 
people – obviously utter profligates - hardly had more than 10 % left. 
13 Plutarch, Galba 2.1-2; 18.2; 23.2-3. 
14 Plutarch, Galba 17.1-5. 
15 Plutarch, Galba 15.1-2; cf. Tacitus, Hist. 1.7.1; Suetonius, Galba 15.2; Cassius Dio 64.3.3-4. 
16 Plutarch, Galba 18.2; Tacitus, Hist. 1.5.2; Suetonius, Galba 16; Cassius Dio 64.3.3. This had obviously 
become a famous dictum by the time they wrote their works. 
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Galba, because he was defrauding them and so doing laid down instructions for succeeding 
emperors.17 
Galba decimated fleet soldiers who had been promoted to legionary status by Nero and 
served in the neighbourhood of Rome. They went out to meet Galba when he was 
approaching Rome, and entreated him to guarantee them their new status. Plutarch tells us:  
Moreover, when, in his approach to the city, he (= Galba) was distant from it about five-and-
twenty furlongs, he fell in with a disorderly and tumultuous crowd of seamen, who beset his 
way and encompassed him on all sides. These were men whom Nero had formed into a legion 
and given the title of soldiers (στρατιώτας). And now they were there to enforce their just 
rights as soldiers, and would not suffer the emperor to be seen or heard by those who came to 
meet him, but with tumultuous shouts demanded standards for their legion and regular quarters. 
When Galba put off their demand and told them to renew it another time, they declared that the 
postponement was merely a way of refusing their demands, and were incensed, and followed 
along with unremitted shouts. Some actually drew their swords, and then Galba ordered his 
horsemen to charge upon them (Plutarch, Galba 15.3-4). 
This led to a massacre among the fleet soldiers. Tacitus, Hist. 1.6.1. and Suetonius, Galba 
12.2 give similar stories. Suetonius tells us that Galba dispersed the fleet soldiers by a cavalry 
charge and had them decimated subsequently. In the same paragraph Suetonius narrates that 
Galba also disbanded a cohort of Germans, whom the previous Caesars had made their body-
guard and had found absolutely faithful in many emergencies.18 Cassius Dio tells a 
comparable story about Nero’s bodyguards, and rather contentedly observes that Galba had 
7000 of them killed, but Cassius Dio in all of his eighty books is virtually obsessed with the 
risks of military power and misconduct and is always satisfied with examples of severitas 
towards soldiers.19 
Galba’s worst mistakes had to do with the upper Rhine army and with the succession. First 
of all Galba utterly neglected the threatening situation in Germania Superior. In A.D. 68 the 
army of this region, under the command of Verginius Rufus, had annihilated the forces of the 
Gallic usurper Vindex, with whom Galba had sympathized. Verginius and his army had stood 
by their oaths of loyalty towards the reigning emperor Nero.20 On top of the grievances that 
were common among all armies, such as annoyance about the emperor’s unwarranted 
meanness and vexation about the behaviour of his assistants, the army of the upper Rhine felt 
defrauded of the reward for its services against the Gauls and Vindex, saw its victorious 
commander Verginius Rufus disappear in a rather dishonourable way, and loathed its new 
commander Hordeonius Flaccus. Besides the soldiers of this army now saw that their enemies 
of a year before, Vindex’ Gauls, were honoured by Galba, Vindex’ former ally, for example 
through grants of citizenship.21 Coins issued in A.D. 68, bearing the legend Concordia 
Hispaniarum et Galliarum on the obverse and the words Victoria p.R. on the reverse, seem to 
suggest that the annoyance of the upper Rhine soldiers was not out of place. This had been 
Vindex’ hope.22 
Secondly Galba selected the wrong person to succeed him. As soon as he had heard about 
the rebellious attitude of the army of the upper Rhine Galba, who was childless and thought 
that the concomitant lack of dynastic continuity undermined his position, decided to adopt a 
successor. Instead of opting for someone who was popular among the soldiery and was an 
experienced administrator, for example Otho, he chose Piso, a man of an impeccable lineage 
                                                 
17 Plutarch, Galba 18.2.  
18 Suetonius, Galba 12.2. 
19 Cassius Dio 64.3.1-2. On Cassius Dio’s views of the soldiery see De Blois 1997a, 2650-2676; idem 1998-
1999, 275 ff.  
20 See Wiedemann in CAH X2, 1996, 256 ff. 
21 Plutarch, Galba 22.1-2; Tacitus, Hist. 1.51 ff.; Suetonius, Galba 16.2. 
22 See McCrum & Woodhead 1966, 36, nr. 26. 
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and of a reputedly even more impeccable character, but a nonentity in politics and among the 
armies. To make things worse, Galba even at this occasion refused to give the soldiers a 
handsome donative. As a matter of fact these two blunders immediately led to Otho’s coup 
and the demise of Galba.23 The latter now also lost the support of much of the middle cadre of 
the praetorian guard. In Galba 24.1 Plutarch describes how middle cadre officers who had 
gone over to Otho, together with one of the latter’s freedmen, corrupted groups of soldiers 
with money and material promises. Suetonius does not mention such activities by military 
middle cadres, but Tacitus does,24 so Plutarch does not give us complete fiction here. Like 
Plutarch, Tacitus is positive about Piso’s character and ethics, and he shows, like Suetonius 
does, that his adoption by Galba triggered Otho’s usurpation.25 
Otho was not really a better leader than Galba had been. In Otho 3.2-6 Plutarch tells us 
that Otho was placing his government on a sound basis and took a number of wise decisions, 
but that the paid soldiers (misthophoroi) made themselves troublesome by urging him not to 
trust the influential citizens. Besides they started to behave in a disorderly way. In Otho 5.3 
Plutarch speaks of the disorderly and arrogant spirit of the soldiers, their ataxia and thrasutès. 
Otho did not behave as a good, strong leader would have done, and did not overcome these 
problems. His best act seems to have been his impressive suicide.26 
At the second level of command there was bad leadership as well. Vinius, Laco, Icelus and 
Nymphidius Sabinus were mentioned already. But also outside Rome, at the upper Rhine, 
leadership was not what it should have been. In Galba 10.1-2 Plutarch tells us that Galba was 
anxious about the attitude of Verginius Rufus, who was commanding a large and efficient 
army and had the added prestige of his victory. After Nero’s demise Verginius’ soldiers 
wanted him to be their emperor, but he did not give in to their wishes. In Galba 10.3 Plutarch 
says:  
But after Fabius Valens, commander of a legion, had led off in taking the oath of allegiance to 
Galba, and letters had come from Rome telling of the senate’s decrees (i.e. to make Galba 
emperor), he succeeded at last, though with the greatest difficulty, in persuading his soldiers to 
declare Galba emperor; and when Galba sent Flaccus Hordeonius to succeed him, Verginius 
received that officer and handed over his army to him. 
The highest leader, Verginius, is hesitating and does not really take firm decisions at the 
right moments, in this way giving the soldiery too much latitude, and so a leader of the second 
rank, Valens, has a hard time to get things right. Verginius’ behaviour is also described by 
other literary sources.27 In the Verginius story leadership comes off much worse than the 
soldiers, who stick to their oaths and only begin to think about a new emperor when it has 
become clear that Nero is no longer their ruler. Plutarch does not deviate from historical 
tradition, in order to depict the soldiers more negatively than they would have deserved. 
Verginius’ successor in Germania Superior, Hordeonius Flaccus, is also depicted as a 
weak leader: too old and too sick. Without the backing of his authority, his officers – in this 
case military tribunes and centurions, i.e. third rank leaders - could not appease their soldiers, 
when the latter were demanding the donative that had been promised to them.28 In Galba 18.4 
Plutarch tells us:  
                                                 
23 On Piso’s adoption and its consequences see Plutarch, Galba 23-25; Tacitus, Hist. 1.12-20; 21-43; Suetonius, 
Galba 17-20; Suetonius, Otho 5.1; Cassius Dio 64.5.1 ff. 
24 Hist. 1.24-25. 
25 Tacitus, Hist. 1.13-20. 
26 On Otho’s reign see Plutarch, Otho 1-18; Tacitus, Hist. 1.44-47; 71-90; 2. 11-56; Suetonius, Otho 7-12; 
Cassius Dio 64.7-15. On Otho’s suicide see Plutarch, Otho 16-18; Tacitus, Hist. 2.48-49; Suetonius, Otho 10-11; 
Cassius Dio 64.13-15.  
27 Tacitus, Hist. 1.8.2; Cassius Dio 63.25.1-3; 27.1.  In 63.1 he calls Verginius an energetic man. He comes off 
better in Dio’s report than in Plutarch’s. 
28 Tacitus, Hist. 1.9.1; Plutarch, Galba 18.1-4. Cf. Suetonius, Galba 16. 
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Of Flaccus himself, who was physically incapacitated by an acute gout, and inexperienced in the 
conduct of affairs, they (i.e. the soldiers of Flaccus’ army) made no account whatever. And once 
at a spectacle, when the military tribunes and centurions, after the Roman custom, invoked 
health and happiness upon the emperor Galba, the mass of the soldiery raised a storm of dissent 
at first, and then, when the officers persisted in their invocation, cried out in response, “if he 
deserves it”. 
According to Plutarch, Galba 22-23, the behaviour of the soldiers of the upper Rhine army 
escalated to unmanageable heights at the beginning of the new year, A.D. 69. At the Calends 
of January they refused to take the customary oath to the emperor, overturned Galba’s statues 
and sweared allegiance to the senate and the people of Rome. Plutarch tells us that then their 
officers – the third line of leadership, which had been positively loyal and effectively leading 
the troops so far – began to fear that their lawless spirit (ἀφάνεια) might issue in revolt and 
started to go along with the soldiers. In the end this resulted in usurpation of the imperial 
purple by Vitellius. Thus bad leadership at top levels resulted in an escalation of military 
misbehaviour and in outright usurpation. Third level leaders could no longer repair things. 
In Plutarch’s Galba and Otho the praetorians in Rome became – in reaction to bad 
leadership at the top and at the second level – ever more unruly as well. In Galba 2.1 they are 
still fairly loyal to their master, Nero. Their commander, Nymphidius Sabinus, who is 
depicted as a very bad character and a depraved leader, has to convince them to opt for Galba 
and act against their oath. He promises the soldiers a impossibly high donative. Plutarch 
observes: 
It was Nymphidius Sabinus, prefect of the court guard along with Tigellinus …. Who, when 
Nero’s case was altogether desperate, and it was clear that he was going to run away to Egypt, 
persuaded (ἔπεισε) the soldiery, as though Nero were no longer there but had already fled, to 
proclaim Galba emperor, and promised as largess seventy-five hundred drachmas29 apiece for 
the court, or praetorian, guards, as they were called, and twelve hundred and fifty drachmas for 
those in service outside of Rome, a sum which it was impossible to raise without inflicting ten 
thousand times more evils upon the world than those inflicted by Nero. This promise was at 
once the death of Nero, and soon afterwards of Galba: the one the soldiers to his fate in order to 
get their reward, the other they killed because they did not get it (Plutarch, Galba 2-3). 
At first sight this passage seems to give us a fine example of avaritia militum, in 
accordance with the introductory chapter of Plutarch’s Galba, but the soldiers do not make 
their choice of their own initiative. They are fairly loyal to their oaths and are only led on by 
bad leaders, as is also described by other literary sources.30  
After Galba had become emperor and had come to Rome the praetorians started to have 
second thoughts about this ruler, because of his meanness, his uncalled for severity towards 
the military - whereas he was lenient towards many other people who did not deserve such 
treatment - and the behaviour of his assistants. Their commander Nymphidius Sabinus, who 
was very much disappointed by Galba’s appointment policies and had begun to think that 
Galba was about to eliminate him, was already trying to become emperor himself. He seemed 
to be successful in stirring up his troops, and the praetorians were already wavering in their 
loyalty to Galba, when - according to Plutarch, Galba 14.1-3 - a third rank leader, the military 
tribune Antonius Honoratus, appeased the angry praetorians, which may be interpreted as a 
sign of failing leadership at higher levels. Honoratus rebuked the praetorians because they 
were on the verge of betraying one emperor after the other, Galba after Nero, and were 
breaking their oaths of allegiance in rapid succession. He was successful, as the usurper 
Nymphidius Sabinus, the praetorian prefect, soon discovered to his misery.31 In this passage 
the soldiers are not utterly depraved, but accessible to morally sound reasoning, even if it 
                                                 
29 Amounting to about 7500 denarii. 
30 See Tacitus, Hist. 1.5.1: … arte magis et impulsu quam suo ingenio traductus ad destituendum Neronem. 
31 Plutarch, Galba 14.1-6. 
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comes from a lower officer who lacks the support of his commander. However, the danger 
was not gone. As Plutarch observes, 
the agitation at Rome was still smouldering, and at the same time a certain respect for Galba’s 
presence blunted and delayed the spirit of revolution, and the absence of any manifest occasion 
for a change repressed and kept under cover, somehow or other, the resentment of the soldiers 
(Galba 18.3). 
Their resentment against the emperor rose explicitly to the point of violence and rebellion 
when Galba adopted Piso instead of anyone who was trusted by the soldiers of the guard, and 
when the military middle cadre began to waver in its loyalty towards Galba (Plutarch, Galba 
24.1). Instrumental in this change for the worse must have been an essential detail that 
Plutarch leaves out. He does not mention that Galba caused some panic among the praetorians 
by discharging many of them, from time to time in small groups, as under suspicion of being 
partisans of Nymphidius Sabinus. Galba also discharged military tribunes, not only from the 
guard, but also from other military units.32 A bad mistake. Any usurper, eventually Otho as 
well as Vitellius, could now find adherents among the military middle cadre. 
The worst was still to come. In Otho 3.3-6 Plutarch tells us that in Rome soldiers of the 
praetorian guard became suspicious when they noticed that weapons were loaded on waggons,  
(probably to equip soldiers who had to participate in the war against the Vitellians, LdB). 
Some attacked the waggons, others killed two centurions who opposed them, as well as 
Crispinus, the responsible higher officer. Plutarch continues:  
Then the whole body, putting themselves in array and exhorting one another to go to the help of 
the emperor, marched to Rome. Here, learning that eighty senators were at supper with Otho, 
they rushed to the palace, declaring that now was a good time to take off all the emperor’s 
enemies at one stroke. Accordingly, the city was in great commotion, expecting to be plundered 
at once; in the palace there were runnings to and fro; and a dire perplexity fell upon Otho. For 
while he had fears about the safety of his guests, he himself was an object of fear to them, and 
he saw that they kept their eyes fixed upon him in speechless terror, some of them having even 
brought their wives with them to the supper. But he sent the prefects of the guard with orders to 
explain matters to the soldiers and appease them, while at the same time he dismissed his guests 
by another door; and they barely made their escape as the soldiers, forcing their way through the 
guards into the great hall, asked what was become of the enemies of Caesar. In this crisis, then, 
Otho stood up on his couch, and after many exhortations, and entreaties, and not without 
plentiful tears, at last succeeded in sending them away (Plutarch, Galba 3.4-7). 
The end of authority and discipline and the utter escalation of military anarchy, and the 
nadir of bad leadership at the top, by Otho, in accordance with the ‘model’ given in Galba 1. 
Other writers, such as Tacitus and Cassius Dio, also tell us about this event, but Plutarch is the 
author who is giving us a clue about the actual cause of the trouble: suspicion among 
praetorian soldiers that the weapons that were being loaded upon waggons would be used 
against the emperor. This essential detail makes the story more comprehensible. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion. According to Plutarch, neither Galba, nor Otho, nor Galba’s assistants, nor 
Nymphidius or Flaccus were leaders who could react in an adroit, efficacious way to justified 
complaints and grievances of the praetorians and other soldiers, or to escalated military greed 
and misbehaviour, and so the worst case scenario developed. Plutarch describes their failure 
in a clever way, showing the escalation of military misconduct, which unfolded over time as a 
consequence of bad leadership at the top and the second level of command. Every now and 
then he shows that officers of the third level of command had to fill the gap, but were no 
                                                 
32 Tacitus, Hist. 1.20.3 tells us that quite a few military tribunes were discharged, which caused fright and 
annoyance among other military men. Cf. Suetonius, Galba 16.1.  
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longer capable of doing so when the soldiery became ever more frustrated and angry. Plutarch 
integrated his ‘model’ of escalating military misbehaviour as a function and result of bad 
leadership very well with historical fundamenta that he must have borrowed from his 
sources.33 Plutarch’s versions are elaborate and full of essential details, such as names and 
ranks, which shows that he respected the information that he got from them, and Plutarch’s 
versions hardly deviates from those given by other literary sources In his Galba and Otho he 
is close to history and historiography. The interaction between bad leadership and an 
escalation of military misbehaviour may be a historical phenomenon, more than a Plutarchan 
invention. 
















                                                 
33 The term fundamenta was borrowed from Cicero, De oratore 2 (15) 63.  
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